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immigration
Did Congress Strip the Federal Circuit Courts of the Power to Review Denials
of Motions to Reopen Immigration Proceedings?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The dramatic amendments to U.S. immigration law in 1996 included various provisions limiting judicial
review of the decisions of immigration agencies and officials. One of the broadest such limitations bars
review of any decision “the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion
of the Attorney General.” Nine years after first being ordered deported, the petitioner, Agron Kucana, filed
a motion to reopen his immigration proceedings on the grounds that changed country conditions now
justified his claim for asylum.

Kucana v. Holder
Docket No. 08-911
Argument Date: November 10, 2009
From: The Seventh Circuit
by Jessica E. Slavin
Marquette University Law School

ISSUE
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bar judicial review of an immigration judge’s denial of a motion to reopen immigration proceedings?

FACTS
This case concerns Agron Kucana’s appeal from the denial of his
second motion to reopen his asylum proceedings. The Seventh Circuit
held, contrary to the arguments of both the United States and Mr.
Kucana, that it was barred from reviewing the motion to reopen. On
appeal, both parties argue that the statutory bar that the Seventh
Circuit relied upon, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), does not apply to
denials of motions to reopen, because nothing in the immigration
statutes “specifie[s]” such motions to be “in the discretion of the
Attorney General,” as required by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Petitioner’s Initial Immigration Proceedings and
First Motion to Reopen
The petitioner, Agron Kucana, is an Albanian citizen who came to the
United States in July 1995 on a visitor’s visa, which authorized him
to remain in the United States for 90 days. He overstayed his visa,
and in May 1996 filed an application for asylum and withholding of
removal, on the grounds that he had fled severe past persecution and
had a well-founded fear of future persecution in Albania due to his
active involvement in the Albanian Democratic Party and the sharp
divisions that developed in that party after it took power in 1992. In
his application, Kucana claimed that after a long series of threats, arrests, and beatings, he finally fled when he received a warrant for his
arrest on charges of “agitating against the party.” His final hearing in
the asylum case was scheduled for October 9, 2007.
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Kucana failed to appear at his hearing, apparently because he slept
through his alarm. His failure to appear meant that consistent with
8 U.S.C. § 1229a, the Immigration Judge issued an in absentia order
for Kucana’s removal from the United States. Kucana filed a motion to
reopen the proceedings, explaining that he had overslept and arrived
at the immigration court soon after the in absentia order was issued.
The Immigration Judge denied that motion because it did not satisfy
the specific admonition of § 1229a(5)(C)(i) that such an order may
only be rescinded based on a showing of “exceptional circumstances,”
i.e., circumstances such as battery, serious illness or death, or other
compelling circumstances beyond the alien’s control. The judge’s
decision that Mr. Kucana could not prove “exceptional circumstances”
justifying a motion to reopen was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals in May 2002.
Enactment of Immigration Reform Limiting Judicial Review
In September 1996, while Kucana’s asylum application was pending, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), which provides in part that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), … and regardless of whether the … decision … is
made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction
to review … any decision … of the Attorney General … the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General … , other than the granting
of relief under section 1158(a) [i.e., asylum].
In that same immigration reform legislation package, Congress
codified a numerical limitation on motions to reopen that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) had recently adopted by regulation.
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In the earlier, less sweeping immigration reform of 1990, Congress
had directed the DOJ to enact a regulation limiting motions to
reopen, and in April 1996, DOJ issued final regulations limiting litigants to a single motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final
administrative decision. The regulation specifies limited exceptions
to the numerical limitation on motions to reopen, including motions
to reopen “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum … based on changed
circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and (3)(ii).
In IIRAIRA, Congress enacted a similar (but not identical) statutory
limitation on motions to reopen, providing that “an alien may file one
motion to reopen proceedings under this section, except that this
limitation shall not apply so as to prevent the filing of one motion
to reopen described in subparagraph (C)(iv).” § 1229a(7)(A). The
specified exception is for motions related to certain forms of relief for
victims of domestic violence. § 1229a(7)(C)(iv).
Petitioner’s Second Motion to Reopen and Appeal
to the Seventh Circuit
Kucana filed his second motion to reopen, in June 2006, on grounds
of new evidence and changed country conditions supporting his
claim for asylum, and on the fact that he was now awaiting another
form of immigration relief, as a beneficiary of his mother’s “immediate relative” petition on his behalf. The motion was supported by a
scholar of Balkan history and modern Albanian politics, who swore
that “Agron Kucana has a reasonable and objective basis to fear
future prosecution.”
This second motion was denied and then appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed denial of the motion on
two grounds: first, that a second motion to reopen must be filed with
the Board (the last decision-maker in the case), and second, that
Kucana could not establish that he was now eligible for asylum “based
on material changes that have occurred in Albania since his failure
to appear,” as required to justify a second motion to reopen under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Kucana appealed to the Seventh Circuit. After the parties briefed
and argued, the Seventh Circuit ordered them to submit an
additional memoranda regarding a jurisdictional issue: whether
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of a motion to reopen because the
regulations specify that the board has discretion to deny motions to
reopen. Both the government and Kucana argued that the provision
could not apply to bar review of BIA decisions not to reopen because
the BIA’s discretion is specified, not “under this subchapter,” i.e., the
statutory subchapter, but only by regulation.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit, in reliance on a prior case holding
that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred review of decisions made discretionary by regulation, held that the section likewise barred its review
of motions to reopen. As the dissenting Judge Cudahy noted, this
decision set the Seventh Circuit at odds with all other circuit courts
to have considered the issue. The Supreme Court thereafter accepted
Kucana’s petition for review.

CASE ANALYSIS
Despite its complicated procedural history, the main issue in the
case appears to be a relatively straightforward exercise of statutory
interpretation. As both Kucana and the solicitor general point out, the
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actual words of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) stripped the courts of authority to
review decisions “the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” They, along
with numerous amici, argue that these words unambiguously limit
the jurisdiction-stripping effect of this provision to decisions that are
defined by statute to as within the attorney general’s discretion. No
one in the case disputes that it is regulations promulgated under the
statute, and not the statute itself, that specifies the BIA’s discretion
with regard to motions to reopen.
Kucana argues, furthermore, that even if there were any ambiguity, three “principles of statutory construction” strongly favor the
interpretation of the majority of the circuits. He also points out that
under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, there would be no check on agencylevel reviews of claims of changed country conditions. Perhaps worse,
the decision seems to mean that the executive branch would have the
power to decide which of its decisions should be subject to judicial
review by specifying which are in its discretion.
The solicitor general’s brief reviews the statutory context, which includes a provision that appeals from denials of motions to reopen may
be consolidated with appeals challenging the underlying final order,
suggesting that Congress foresaw review of motions to reopen. The
government also reviews the legal history of motions to reopen in immigration court, emphasizing that the motion was a judicial creation
that had only months earlier been put into regulation, when Congress
first enacted provisions relating to motions to reopen in 1996. “The
federal courts long have reviewed denials of motions to reopen, and
Congress did not indicate any intention to change that practice,” the
solicitor general argues.
The brief of the court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the
judgment essentially argues that the legislative history and purpose
behind IIRAIRA and, specifically, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), show that Congress wanted to enact a sweeping bar, and that the history of motions
to reopen in immigration court confirms that Congress must have
meant this bar to extend to motions to reopen. The brief recounts the
history of the judicial development of motions to reopen, congressional frustration with delay perceived to follow from the availability
of those motions, the Congress-directed promulgation of regulations
limiting the availability of those motions, and the ultimate enactment
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). “All told,” the amicus argues, “reading ‘under
this subchapter’ to include decisions and actions made discretionary
by a regulation promulgated under the subchapter is not only ‘most in
accord with context and ordinary usage, …” but also “most compatible with the surrounding body of law. … ”

SIGNIFICANCE
The case has great significance. Removing all judicial review from
denials of motions to reopen would obviously insulate a large number
of immigration decisions from any judicial review. Such a situation
appears troublesome in view of widely perceived weaknesses in the
quality of decision making at the administrative level, some of which
are addressed in the amicus brief of the National Immigrant Justice
Center and other immigration advocates.
Furthermore, motions to reopen are just one of many types of decisions that immigration regulations place in the discretion of the
“Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,” (i.e., virtuPREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

ally all immigration-related agencies and officials). If the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation were applied broadly, then a wide swath of
decisions that have been subject to judicial review will be left to the
absolute discretion of the administrative decision makers. The ACLU,
for these reasons, urges the Court to limit its consideration to the
particular question before it, whether judicial review of motions to
reopen is barred, and to leave for another day questions of whether
review of other decisions and actions is barred, as the lower courts
continue to consider and develop law concerning those questions.
The argument of the amici supporting the judgment, the Washington
Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation, attempts to
shift the focus to an entirely new basis for denying review, arguing
that Kucana’s second motion to reopen was barred in the first place,
because Congress did not expressly incorporate the “changed circumstances” exception to the numerical limitation on motions to reopen.
These amici argue that “[i]n light of the timing … the legislation
can only be viewed as an explicit rejection of the Department of
Justice rule permitting waiver of the one-motion-to-reopen rule with
respect to claims for asylum and withholding of removal.”
In addition to being at odds with U.S. treaty obligations not to return
refugees to persecution, such an interpretation seems to raise serious constitutional questions that have in recent years led the Court
to favor interpretations of IIRAIRA that preserve judicial review. See
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001). In fact, in response to such concerns, Congress passed a
post-IIRAIRA amendment that provides that nothing in that legislation “which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised
upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals
in accordance with this section,” § 1252(a)(2)(D). Because Kucana
challenged the decision below only as an abuse of discretion, this
case does not seem to provide an opportunity to apply that provision.
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